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Abstract: A considerable share of the population is poor in the European Union (EU), among which 
many are poor despite working. Immigrants are overrepresented among the working poor. Working 
immigrants dispose lower equivalent household income on average and face higher risks of falling 
into poverty than working natives, according to a cross-sectional regression analysis on a sample of 22 
EU member states in 2011 (based on EU-SILC 2012). The differential between the two groups shrinks 
considerably, though does not disappear, when controlling for micro level factors (socio-demographic 
characteristics such as attained education level, occupation, household size) of the level of household 
income and the risk of in-work poverty. The income gap underlines the need for better social inclusion 
of immigrants.
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Introduction
Employment is essential for integrating immigrants into European societies, 
although work may not be sufficient in itself to ensure the social inclusion of the 
foreign born. In this paper I describe whether working immigrants tend to have 
lower household incomes than working natives, and, correspondingly, whether they 
have a higher chance of being working poor, even when the observable compositional 
differences between the two groups are controlled for. 
Immigrants are increasingly present in the labor market, having accounted for 
70% of the growth in the workforce in Europe over the last decade (OECD 2014a). A 
considerable share of the population of the EU (approximately 10%) are estimated to 
be foreign born (Eurostat 2015a). It follows that the integration and social inclusion 
of immigrants is an increasingly challenging and laborious process. This statement 
rings particularly true when one bears in mind the recent and intense discourse 
about immigration. Evidence-based analysis that yields a more comprehensible view 
of the situation of immigrants is thus of significant importance to policy making. I 
1 An earlier version of this paper was submitted in the form of a thesis for a Master of Arts in Economic Policy in Global Markets 
at Central European University. I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Professor Lajos Bokros for his kind 
support. I would like to also thank TÁRKI for access to the related database, and to István György Tóth and Márton Medgyesi 
for comments. 
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contribute to the discourse by focusing on the case of working immigrants who are 
participating in the local labor market. Paying special attention to immigrants is 
key, as this group is overrepresented among the working poor in Europe.  
I analyze the working population using a sample of 22 member states of the EU, 
based on the EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) 
for year 2012 (referring to income year 2011) in order to generate a snapshot of the 
poverty of the stock of immigrants at that point in time. I undertake cross-sectional 
linear regression analysis, for which the dependent variable is equivalent disposable 
household income, and the main independent variable of interest is ‘foreign born’ 
status. I then estimate in-work poverty using a linear probability model in order to 
identify whether immigrants are more likely to be working poor than their native 
counterparts. I control for the micro-level explanatory factors that affect household 
income and in-work poverty to account for the observable heterogeneity among 
immigrants and natives. Compositional differences between the two groups are 
responsible for the bulk of the income differential, although a considerable part of the 
difference remains unexplained. Many of the sources of unobserved heterogeneity, 
such as the difference in the motivation of immigrants on the labor market and in 
the host country in general, cannot be disregarded. Similarly, I cannot rule out the 
possibility that immigrants encounter different and often discriminatory treatment 
from the native born. However, some of the potential reasons for the (explained and 
unexplained) income differential may be addressed using integration policies. 
The vulnerable group of immigrants 
The foreign-born population numbered 50.8 million in the EU-272 as of 1 January 
2013, accounting for approximately 10% of the population. From this number, 33.5 
million were born outside of the EU-27, while 17.3 million were born in an EU-27 
member state different to their country of residence (Eurostat 2015a). The largest 
number of immigrants live in Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, France and Spain; 
the number is highest relative to the native population in Luxemburg (44%) and also 
is also high (above 10%) in Cyprus, Latvia, Estonia, Ireland, Austria, Belgium and 
Spain. In Western Europe the proportion of foreign born almost doubled from less 
than 8% of the population in 1996 to almost 14% in 2010 (Eurostat 2015a; D’Amuri 
– Peri 2011). Accordingly, strengthening the social inclusion of immigrants is of 
growing importance if social cohesion is to be maintained in European countries. 
Research that has focused on the circumstances of immigrants in the recipient 
country found that immigrants are more likely to be at risk of poverty. A person is 
at risk of poverty if he or she lives in a household with a disposable income that is 
2 EU27 stands for the 27 member states of the European Union; all the current member states, except for Croatia. 
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below 60% of the median equivalent income of the population in the country.3 One 
out of ten people at risk of poverty in the EU are foreign born (Lelkes et al. 2010). 
Employment status is strongly associated with risk of poverty in the case of the 
native born, and even more so in the case of immigrants. Work is ‘proportionally’ 
more important for immigrants as it represents a method of integrating into a 
society when established networks of relatives and friends in the recipient country 
may be lacking. The risk of falling under the poverty line for the working-age 
population is highest (47.5%) among immigrants born outside the EU who live in a 
household with low work intensity (0-0.49); locals with similarly low work intensity 
face only a 38% probability of entering a situation of poverty (Lelkes et al. 2012). 
Some of the underlying reasons for the native-immigrant labor market gaps include 
the shorter time spent in the host country, less social capital and lower returns on 
human capital (Guzi et al. 2015) of immigrants. It follows that the earnings and 
social bonds that are created through being employed extensively decrease the 
vulnerability of the foreign born (Bevelander – Groeneveld 2007). The relationship 
between employment and poverty indicates that work may be a route through which 
immigrants can escape poverty. 
However, having earnings from employment may not preclude an individual 
falling into a state of poverty; this phenomenon is referred to as in-work poverty. 
A person is defined as being ‘in-work poor’ if he or she has worked for a substantial 
part of a reference year (i.e. has been an employee or self-employed, either in full or 
part-time work for at least 7 months in the calendar year of the survey) and is still at 
risk of poverty. Approximately 9% of the working age population were working poor 
in the EU in 2012 (Eurostat 2015b).
 The phenomenon of working poverty is regarded as an attribute of post-
industrial societies that have experienced skill-biased technological changes 
(Goldin – Katz 2007; Acemoglu – Autor 2012), which have shifted demand toward 
more skilled labor, resulting in greater wage inequality. In fact, demand is on the 
rise not only for the highest-skilled occupations (managers and other professionals), 
but also for the lowest-skilled occupations in the service sector, while mid-
level employment opportunities (in terms of skills and occupation distribution, 
including manufacturing and routine office jobs) is declining due to routinization 
and automation (Autor et al. 2003). Accordingly, the OECD database shows that 
wage dispersion increasingly favors those toward the top end (OECD 2008, 2011). 
The processes of job polarization (Goos et al. 2011) and labor market segmentation 
(Frazer et al. 2011) have taken root in Europe, although they vary in intensity across 
countries. 
3 Poverty in this paper refers to the ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator, unless a different meaning is indicated. The aim of the country-
specific relative income poverty lines and targets are to ensure the right of residents to fully participate in their respective 
societies. For a review of the merits and drawbacks of the ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator, see Atkinson et al. 2002, Decancq et al. 
2013.
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Figure 1. In-work poverty rate in the countries of the EU27 (% of working population aged 
18-64).
Source: author’s own calculation based on EU-SILC 2012. No data was available for Romania about the status of immigrants 
among the working poor.4
A snapshot of in-work poverty rates in the EU in 2012 shows that there is variability 
across countries in terms of the share of the working population affected by poverty, 
ranging from less than 5% to almost 20% (see Figure 1). There is also significant 
variance across countries in terms of the share of immigrants among the working 
poor (see Figures 1 and 2). Immigrant status is defined in the paper as being foreign 
born, following Lelkes et al. (2010). Luxembourg stands out with approximately 80% 
immigrants among the working poor. The proportion of immigrants is also high in 
southern Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, Spain, Italy, and Greece) and in Belgium 
and Austria. Comparison of the proportion of migrants among the population of 
working and the working poor indicates that they are overrepresented among the 
working poor population in most countries (Figure 2). The difference between the 
shares of immigrants in the two subpopulations is striking in Belgium, Slovenia, 
Cyprus and Denmark.
4 Country codes for Figure 1. and 2. are the following: BE – Belgium, BG – Bulgaria, CZ – Czech Republic, DK – Denmark, DE 
– Germany, EE – Estonia, IE – Ireland, EL – Greece, ES – Spain, FR – France, IT – Italy, CY – Cyprus, LV – Latvia, LT – Lithuania, 
LU – Luxembourg, HU – Hungary, MT – Malta, NL – Netherlands, AT – Austria, PL – Poland, PT – Portugal, RO – Romania, SI – 
Slovenia, SK – Slovakia, FI – Finland, SE – Sweden, UK – United Kingdom.
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Figure 2. Proportion of immigrants among the working and the working poor population 
(aged 18-64 years) in the EU, by country (2012). 
Source: Author’s construction derived from data from EU-SILC 2012. 
It is uncertain if immigrants are proportionally more significantly affected because 
of compositional differences between the groups of natives and immigrants, such 
as age, educational and household structure, etc., or if some variance between the 
two populations is not explainable using observable variables that are known to 
generally influence working poverty. 
Research question
The idea of work as a path to welfare leads to the main research questions: do 
immigrants have the same/a similar chance as natives to escape poverty through 
work? Do working immigrants in the EU earn less than the 60% of the country’s 
median disposable household income, and thus face higher risks of falling into 
working poverty than working natives? If so, does this hold true even when both 
micro-level factors (compositional differences between the two groups, such as 
different levels of education, occupations, household sizes and differences between 
the countries, etc.) and macro-level explanatory variables (differences in labor 
market institutions and welfare regimes) of in-work poverty are controlled for?
I focus on immigrants who have already partly integrated into society via work, and 
compare working immigrants and working natives in terms of their poverty outcomes. 
The reader should bear in mind that the research the paper is based on was more of 
an exploratory study than an attempt to identify causalities. Evidence of an income 
gap between working immigrants and natives would suggest that activation policies 
should be complemented by further measures designed to facilitate the integration of 
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migrants. Any differences that remain between the two groups after compositional 
differences are accounted for will indicate that alleviating the poverty of immigrants 
will require policy tools that are specifically tailored to meeting their needs.   
Data and methods
The main source of data is EU-SILC 2012 for income year 2011. I analyze the working 
population (18-64 year-olds) in 22 countries of the EU5 based on EU-SILC 2012. 
The sample consists of household heads, as their socio-economic status is a good 
predictor of the poverty risk of their households6.
The dependent variable is a measure of household income relative to the median 
income of the country, indicating the household’s place in society in terms of 
disposable income. In the OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) regressions the dependent 
variable is defined as the equivalent disposable household income of the household 
head expressed as a percentage of the median equivalent disposable household 
income of the country of residence. In the linear probability models the outcome 
variable is in-work poverty (defined as having an equivalent disposable household 
income that is less than 60% of the national median income, despite being in work, 
as defined previously).
The main independent variable of interest, immigrant status, is defined as being 
foreign born, following Lelkes et al. (2010).7 Accordingly, second generations of 
foreign born persons are not regarded as immigrants according to this country-
of-birth-based definition. It follows that natives are those persons who were born 
to mothers that were at the time residing in the country in question. Some of the 
limitations of this definition of ‘immigrant’ are that it provides no information 
about the extent of assimilation or integration (note that some of the foreign born 
may already have gained citizenship in the country of residence). Nor does it indicate 
ethnicity; migrants are simply categorized as having being born in the EU, or outside 
it. Furthermore, illegal and temporary migrants are inevitably underrepresented in 
the survey.
First, I estimate the income gap between working immigrants and natives using 
OLS, as specified in the following way: 
Yi = c + α1IMMi + β1DEMi + β2EMPi + β3HHDi + β4MACi + µ1CNTR + Єi (1)
5 The sample size is limited as some of the countries in the east of Europe - such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia - had very few immigrants, according to the available data.
6 The household head is taken to be the oldest man of working age (18-64), or the oldest woman of working age if there is 
no man of working age in the household, following the definition provided by Lelkes et al. (2012). Middle-aged men are 
overrepresented among household heads, so I mostly compare the poverty risk of households with an immigrant head to the 
poverty risk of households with a native head, where both heads are likely to be middle-aged men.
7 EU-SILC provides information about citizenship as well; however, this is an unreliable indicator of immigrant status for cross-
country analysis purposes as the rules and regulations concerning the acquisition of citizenship vary between countries.
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The unit of analysis is the working household head denoted by ‘i’. Again, ‘Y’ is the 
equivalent disposable household income of the household head expressed as a 
percentage of the median equivalent disposable household income of the country of 
residence. ‘IMM’ is a dummy variable set to unity if the individual is foreign born. I 
also estimate the model employing a distinction between immigrants either born in or 
outside the EU, assuming that they may have systematically different in-work poverty 
outcomes. 
‘DEM’ stands for the vector of the demographic characteristics of the individual 
(age, gender, marital status and highest educational attainment). ‘EMP’ is a vector 
of the labor market circumstances of the individual (occupation, working time, 
type of employment, type of contract). ‘HHD’ represents the characteristics of the 
household (number of full and part-time employees, number of dependent members). 
These control variables are included as the sociodemographic profile of the working 
poor; potentially vulnerable groups include young persons (i.e. those with less work 
experience) (Peña-Casas – Latta 2004), single parents (particularly single mothers), 
the poorly educated (which strongly influences returns to labor) (Newman – Chen 
2008), part-time and temporary workers  (Lohmann 2009; Marx – Nolan 2012; 
Spannagel 2013), and individuals who live in large households. (See the definitions 
and operationalization of the micro-level explanatory variables of in-work poverty in 
Table 1 in the Appendix.) The models estimate cluster-robust standard errors that are 
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity, while also allowing for arbitrary correlation 
between observation errors from the same country (Cameron – Miller 2013). ‘CNTR’ 
represents country-fixed effects to account for the heterogeneity of the EU member 
states that may affect in-work poverty.
‘MAC’ stands for the country-level control variables which describe the labor 
market institutions of the country, the characteristics of the welfare regime and 
general macroeconomic status. Variables include the coordination of wage setting, 
as this is an indicator of bargaining coverage which influences working poverty 
(Lohmann 2009). The share of poorly educated people (generally with associated 
lower returns to labor) in the country is also a significant explanatory variable 
in cross-country working poverty variability (Spannagel 2013). Welfare regimes 
may counteract earnings inequality on the labor market through processes of 
redistribution. Welfare system factors that may explain variance in in-work poverty 
include variations in unemployment benefits and the size and targeting of family 
and child benefits (Lohmann 2009). Public expenditure on child care and pre-school 
also matter as they increase female participation in the labor market, and dual 
earner households are at lower risk of being poor (Spannagel 2013). (The macro-level 
variables are summarized in Table 2 in the Appendix.)
The analysis proceeds with the use of linear probability models to investigate 
whether immigrants are more likely to be working poor than natives. The dependent 
variable of in-work poverty is binary (taking a value of 0 if a working individual is 
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above the poverty line, and 1 if below). Apart from the different dependent variables, 
the model specifications are similar to those employed in the OLS regressions.
Results and discussion
Before presenting the results of the regression, the raw socio-demographic profiles of 
working immigrants and natives in the 22 member states of the EU are summarized 
in Table 1.  The average age of working immigrant household heads is slightly lower 
than their native counterparts, and there are somewhat more dependent and fewer 
full-time employed household members among the immigrant group. Part-time 
jobs, and especially temporary job contracts, are more widespread among the foreign 
born. The distribution of level of education of the two groups is similar, although 
the share of both high educational attainment and lower educational attainment is 
slightly higher for immigrants. Occupational distribution differs more significantly: 
a much greater share of immigrants have elementary occupations, especially the 
foreign born who have come from outside the EU. 
Table 1. Socio-demographic profile of immigrants and natives.
Natives Immigrants From EU From outside EU
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
High level education 0.37 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.39 0.49
Mid-level education 0.43 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.39 0.49
Low level education 0.20 0.40 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.42
Professional 0.27 0.44 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.20 0.40
Technician 0.16 0.37 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.30
Support/service 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.50
Elementary 0.06 0.24 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.30 0.17 0.38
Age (mean) 45.48 10.81 43.97 10.42 42.87 10.32 44.68 10.43
Female 0.16 0.36 0.18 0.39 0.16 0.37 0.20 0.40
Marital 0.41 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.35 0.48
Dependent members 
(number)
1.00 1.05 1.10 1.12 1.00 1.06 1.16 1.16
Full time employed 
members (number)
1.32 0.74 1.24 0.73 1.27 0.71 1.22 0.75
Part time job 0.08 0.28 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.32
Self-employed 0.18 0.38 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32
Temporary contract 0.08 0.27 0.15 0.35 0.11 0.32 0.17 0.38
The mean indicates the share of individuals in the sample of natives and immigrants (from inside and outside the EU) who fall 
into the specific category (e.g. of having higher/lower educational attainment).
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OLS estimations
The findings of the OLS regression show that the expected disposable household 
income of an immigrant, expressed as a percentage of the median disposable 
household income in the country, is 18 percentage point lower than that of a native 
when only country-fixed effects are included (see model M1.0). The difference 
decreases gradually when observable, individual-level factors are controlled for 
(M1.1-3.). The baseline model (M1.3) indicates that if micro-level characteristics are 
controlled for, the average gap between immigrant and native household income (as 
a % of the median) drops to 10 percentage point (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Regression results of Model (1). 
Household income (% of median) M1.0 M1.1 M1.2 M1.3
Immigrant -0.176*** -0.156*** -0.110*** -0.104***
(0.0410) (0.0240) (0.0221) (0.0219)
Mid-level education -0.355*** -0.156*** -0.157***
(0.0188) (0.0115) (0.0115)
Low level education -0.527*** -0.277*** -0.276***
(0.0306) (0.0217) (0.0214)
Technician -0.237*** -0.238***
(0.0218) (0.0217)
Support/service -0.427*** -0.427***
(0.0301) (0.0301)
Elementary -0.491*** -0.489***
(0.0291) (0.0294)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Labor market circumstances Yes
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.243*** -0.107 0.330*** 0.342***
(0.00643) (0.0925) (0.0808) (0.0798)
Observations 65,603 65,603 65,603 65,603
R-squared 0.030 0.271 0.302 0.303
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Confidence levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The reference category for the 
Education dummies is highly educated. The reference category for the Occupation dummies is professional occupation.
Education and occupation are strongly correlated to household income, as theory 
predicts. A household head with an elementary education will on average dispose 
of 28 p.p. (percentage point) less income than a peer with tertiary education, 
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everything else being kept constant. Similarly, elementary-level workers earn 49 
p.p. less on average than professionals when other variables are unaltered (M1.3). 
Interestingly, the difference in average household income only slightly narrows 
when education level is controlled for (a1=-0.16 in M1.1). However, when occupation 
is accounted for, the gap between the household income of immigrants and natives 
decreases considerably (a1 =-0.11 in M1.2). This indicates that immigrants may end 
up in lower-skilled occupations, not being able to fully make use of or benefit from 
their educations. 
Summary statistics also indicate that a more severe education-occupation 
mismatch exists among immigrants.8 More than 20% of the foreign born who have 
elementary-level occupations have a tertiary degree, compared to less than 10% 
of natives (see Figure 3 and Table 1).9 One potentially significant reason for this 
mismatch is that the skills acquired in the country of origin are not transferable to 
the host country’s labor market (Kogan 2011).
Figure 3. Education vs. occupation of immigrants and natives (share, %). 
     
Note: the sample consists of the working population from the age of 18-64 in 22 member states of the EU. Source: author’s 
construction derived from data from EU-SILC 2012.
The same set of regressions applied to the two groups of immigrants (those born inside 
and those outside the EU) show that the income gap is sizeable when compositional 
differences between the two groups are not controlled for (see Table 3). The foreign 
born from outside the EU fare worse; they have on average 19 p.p. lower household 
income on average than natives, while the gap is only 15 p.p. between immigrants 
born in the EU and natives. However, this income gap between the immigrants 
disappears when all the micro-level control variables are included, which suggests 
8 In almost every case immigrants are more likely to be overqualified, not only at the aggregate, EU level but at the country level 
as well, especially in Greece, Spain and Italy (OECD 2014b: 60).
9 A significant educational mismatch among high-skilled immigrants was also found for the US labor market (Chiswick and Miller 2009).
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that the compositional differences between the immigrants born inside and outside 
the EU are not substantial. 
Table 3. Regression results of Model (1): immigrants born inside and outside the EU.
 Household income (% of median) M1.0 M1.1 M1.2 M1.3
Immigrant_eu -0.147*** -0.141*** -0.109*** -0.107***
(0.0416) (0.0311) (0.0287) (0.0283)
Immigrant_o -0.194*** -0.165*** -0.110*** -0.103***
(0.0476) (0.0274) (0.0246) (0.0242)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Occupational controls Yes Yes
Labor market circumstances Yes
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.242*** -0.107 0.330*** 0.343***
(0.00635) (0.0925) (0.0811) (0.0800)
Observations 65,603 65,603 65,603 65,603
R-squared 0.030 0.271 0.302 0.303
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Confidence levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The reference category for the 
Immigrant dummies is Native.
Several robustness checks of the baseline model (M1.3) were made to see how 
consistent the estimated coefficient of immigrant status is. I also included the 
macro-level variables to control for observed country characteristics that may 
explain the heterogeneity in disposable household income (see Table 4). As the 
country-fixed effects already account for most of the macro sources of variance in 
income dispersion, the overall picture does not change significantly. The regressions 
are supplemented with model M1.4, a hierarchical linear model, to account for the 
nested nature of the dataset (given that household heads are nested in countries). 
Intra-class correlation is significant; the estimation indicates that 0.2% of the 
variation in household income is due to differences across countries, if all else is kept 
equal. The close-to-zero intra-class correlation indicates that individual (micro)-
level differences better explain income variability. 
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Table 4. Regression results of Model (1), micro and macro-level control variables included.
Household income (% of median) M1.0 M1.1 M1.2 M1.3 M1.4
Immigrant -0.154*** -0.112*** -0.111***
(0.0434) (0.0265) (0.0107)
Immigrant_eu -0.127** -0.102**
(0.0441) (0.0357)
Immigrant_o -0.169*** -0.118***
(0.0516) (0.0290)
Micro-level controls Yes Yes Yes
Labor market institutions variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Welfare regime variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.238*** 2.571*** 4.222*** 2.565*** 2.024***
(0.0713) (0.0959) (0.0692) (0.101) (0.361)
Observations 50,672 50,672 50,672 50,672 50,672
R-squared 0.024 0.289 0.024 0.289
Sigma_u 0.0364***
Sigma_e 0.745***
Rho 0.002***
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Confidence levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The reference category for the 
Immigrant dummies is Native.  M1.4: Likelihood-ratio test of sigma_u=0: chibar2(01)=   63.20 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000. 
I also re-estimated the model on several subsamples (see Table 3 in Appendix). 
Estimations on the sample of the EU15 countries remained largely unchanged. 
The difference between the baseline results and those for the subsample that 
includes Germany, Spain, Italy, United Kingdom and France, where the largest 
number of immigrants reside, are not substantial either.  On the other hand, 
in the Mediterranean countries where in-work poverty is high (Greece, Spain, 
Italy and Portugal), the income gap between immigrants and natives is higher. 
Another interesting finding is that in these Mediterranean countries the estimated 
coefficients for immigrants from inside the EU and outside the EU do not converge 
strongly, although the estimated coefficient for being a working immigrant born 
outside the EU is not significant. All in all, the coefficient of the immigrant dummy 
is stable. These re-estimations prove that household income and being an immigrant 
to the EU are significantly correlated in a negative direction. 
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Linear probability model
The results of the linear probability models suggest that an immigrant has a 10 p.p. higher 
probability on average of being working poor compared to a native if only country-fixed 
effects are incorporated (see Table 5). The difference between the two groups decreases 
gradually when individual and country-level observable control variables are included. 
The risk of falling into in-work poverty is predicted to be 7 p.p. higher for those who 
are foreign born, keeping all else constant (M2.3). The difference is thus considerable. 
On average, a working household head with only an elementary degree compared to a 
working household head who has been through tertiary education faces a similarly higher 
risk (6 p.p.) of entering a state of working poverty as an immigrant faces (7 p.p. higher risk 
on average) compared to a native, all else being equal (M2.3). To account for the nested 
structure of the data and some of the shortcomings of the linear probability model, I 
also estimated a multilevel logit model with the same variables as for model M2.3 (see 
Table 4 in Appendix). The intra-class correlation suggests that 3% of the variability in the 
propensity to become in-work poor can be attributed to cross-country differences.
Table 5. Regression results of Model (2). 
Working poverty M2.0 M2.1 M2.2 M2.3
Immigrant 0.0976*** 0.0895*** 0.0777*** 0.0712***
(0.0182) (0.0146) (0.0129) (0.0116)
Mid-level education 0.0396*** 0.0151*** 0.0153***
(0.00525) (0.00309) (0.00290)
Low-level education 0.0998*** 0.0599*** 0.0579***
(0.0104) (0.00726) (0.00670)
Technician 0.00130 0.00224
(0.00227) (0.00239)
Support/service 0.0432*** 0.0408***
(0.00488) (0.00460)
Elementary 0.117*** 0.105***
(0.0148) (0.0131)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Labor market circumstances Yes
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.0239*** 0.232*** 0.178*** 0.152***
(0.00285) (0.0227) (0.0190) (0.0162)
Observations 65,603 65,603 65,603 65,603
R-squared 0.024 0.085 0.098 0.112
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Confidence levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The reference category for the 
Education dummies is high-level education. The reference category for the Occupation dummies is professional occupation.
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On average, immigrants born in the EU have a 7 p.p., and immigrants born outside 
the EU a 12 p.p. higher probability, compared to natives, of being poor, in spite of 
being in work (see Table 5). The difference between the two categories of immigrants 
is rather stable due to the inclusion of micro-level control variables, in contrast to 
the results of the OLS regressions. This may indicate that immigrants born outside 
the EU tend to have incomes at the lower end of the household income distribution 
compared to their counterparts that were born in the EU.
Table 6. Regression results of Model (2): immigrants born inside and outside the EU.
Working poverty M2.0 M2.1 M2.2 M2.3
Immigrant_b_eu 0.0668*** 0.0657*** 0.0586*** 0.0547***
(0.0126) (0.0101) (0.00986) (0.00930)
Immigrant_b_o 0.116*** 0.104*** 0.0890*** 0.0811***
(0.0262) (0.0213) (0.0188) (0.0169)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Occupation controls Yes Yes
Labor market circumstances Yes
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.0247*** 0.233*** 0.179*** 0.153***
(0.00283) (0.0226) (0.0189) (0.0161)
Observations 65,603 65,603 65,603 65,603
R-squared 0.025 0.085 0.098 0.113
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Confidence levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The reference category for the 
Education dummies is high-level education. The reference category for the Occupation dummies is professional occupation.
Overall discussion of the results 
I would here like to re-emphasize that the research described in this paper was 
not designed to establish a causal relationship between immigrant status and low 
household income, or in-work poverty. The potential shortcomings of the estimations 
include the fact that being working poor may be caused by other, omitted variables 
that are also correlated with immigrant status. Another potential problem is the 
existence of spurious correlations or non-linear relationships between household 
income and the explanatory variables. Apart from the general pitfalls of linear 
regression models, linear probability models may predict probabilities of below 0 or 
above 1; estimations are moreover often biased and inconsistent (Horrace – Oaxaca 
2006). 
Country natives (locally born, regardless of ethnicity) cannot be regarded as 
a coherent group against which to compare immigrants (a heterogeneous pool of 
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foreign born from all around the world) due to unobserved heterogeneity. Omitted 
variables that may explain the remaining income gap between immigrants and 
natives include ethnicity, cultural differences, poor language proficiency, weaker 
social networks in the host country, and lower rates of benefit take-up. Many of these 
factors may be related to time spent in the host country (Kahanec – Zimmermann 
2008), which in this research effort is unknown and unaccounted for. Accordingly, 
the cross-sectional analysis does not account for cohort effects; namely the fact that 
immigrants and host country policies may be different at different times of arrival 
(Borjas 1985 in Kahanec and Zimmermann 2008). 
Additionally, immigrants are a self-selected group. They may be more motivated to 
compete on the labor market than their native peers (Borjas 1987; Chiquiar – Hanson 
2002). The higher employment rate of immigrants (especially new-comers) than 
natives emphasizes the existence of positive selection in many European countries 
(Kahanec – Zimmermann 2008). Despite this fact, temporary immigrants may only 
take up short-term, lower-skilled jobs in order to quickly enter the labor market. These 
intrinsic characteristics (i.e. the motivation of immigrants regarding employment 
and work incentives) remain an important source of unidentified heterogeneity 
among immigrants and natives, and the probability of accounting for such variance 
by matching based on EU-SILC data is very low. Therefore the unexplained difference 
between immigrants and natives in terms of poverty should not be interpreted as 
evidence of discrimination against the foreign born. 
Nonetheless, the gap is considerable, a finding which is in line with other 
estimations of immigrant-native gaps in occupational distribution and earnings 
(Dustmann – Frattini 2011). Some (less than half) of the raw differences between 
the income and poverty outcomes of immigrants and natives are explained by the 
micro-level controls, though a considerable part of the gap remains unexplained, 
which suggests that foreign-born residents either behave differently, or are treated 
differently to natives. Apart from the motivational differences mentioned above, 
immigrants may be treated differently on the labor market or otherwise be affected 
in different ways by welfare systems. Keeping in mind the limits of the conclusions 
that emerge from the results, and with no intention of implying causality, it is still 
justifiable to claim that there is room for convergence between the household income 
of the foreign and locally-born populations.
Concluding remarks
The research described in this paper has identified the gap between the household 
incomes of working immigrants and natives, even when the observable compositional 
differences between the two groups are controlled for. Based on a cross-sectional 
regression analysis using the EU-SILC database of 2012 it can be stated that 
immigrants have on average a 10 p.p. lower income and are 7 p.p. more likely to 
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be working poor, all else being equal. There are probably several explanations for 
the unexplained part of this income gap, including the fact that the foreign born 
and natives have different unobserved motivations and behavior. Also, they may be 
treated differently on the labor market, or be differently affected by welfare systems. 
The policy implications of the finding that working immigrants are poorer on 
average than working natives are numerous. The income gap indicates that immigrants 
should be better socially integrated, especially those who are more vulnerable, and 
less well educated. The unexplained part of the difference in the estimations which 
remains after observable compositional differences are controlled for suggests 
that immigrants are a distinct group, and thus would benefit from targeted policy 
interventions, in addition to the general policy tools that are employed to reduce in-
work poverty. Immigrant integration policies should be designed and implemented 
with due consideration of several elements: economic (the costs and benefits 
of immigrants on the labor market in ageing societies), political (the political 
feasibility of policies) and moral (social solidarity and justice), keeping in mind the 
cross-country differences in Europe. Activation policies could be complemented by 
policies that are designed to foster better utilization of the skills of immigrants by 
recognizing as well as upgrading their human capital assets. Language education 
and vocational training may help lift the working foreign born out of poverty, 
especially those whose income is at the lower end of the income distribution and are 
characterized by having weaker skillsets. Careful tailoring of immigration policy to 
the specific country context in order to make use of immigrants’ economic potential 
in a politically feasible manner, and in line with high moral standards, is likely to 
remain a challenge in Europe for the coming decades.   
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Appendix
Table 1. Micro-level explanatory variables of in-work poverty.
Variable Operationalization
Individual level
Age Year of survey (rb010) minus Year of birth (rb080)
Gender Sex (rb090) 0=Male, 1=Female
Immigrant status Country of birth (pb210) is different to country of 
residence. 0=native, 1=immigrant; ‘immigrant_o’ stands for 
immigrant from a non-EU country, ‘immigrant_eu’ for an 
immigrant from an EU country.
Marital status Based on Marital status (pb190) 0=Never married or 
Married, 1= Separated or Widowed or Divorced
Education Based on Highest ISCED level attained (pe040) 0=higher 
than post-secondary education, labelled High level 
education; 1=upper secondary education, labelled Mid-level 
education; 2=lower secondary or lower education level, 
labelled Low level education.
Household level
Number dependent members Number of household members who are younger than 18 
years of age, or between 18 and 24 and studying (based on 
self-defined current economic status (pl031) pupil, student, 
further training, unpaid work experience) or above 64 years
Number of employed members working 
full time
Number of household members who are employees or self-
employed, working full time (based on self-defined current 
economic status (pl031))
Number of employed members working 
part time
Number of household members who are employees or 
self-employed, working part time (based on self-defined 
current economic status (pl031))
Labor market circumstance
Occupation Variables based on Occupation (ISCO-08) (pl051) 
codes. Professional (0) stands for codes: 1=Managers, 
2=Professionals; Technician (1) for code: 3=Technicians 
and associate professionals. Support/service (2) for 
codes: 4=Clerical support workers, 5=Service and sales 
workers, 6=Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery 
workers, 7=Craft and related trades workers, 8=Plant and 
machine operators, and assemblers, Elementary for code: 
9=Elementary occupations.
Working time Based on self-defined current economic status (pl031) 
0=employee or self-employed working full time, 
1=employee or self-employed working part time 
Employment status Based on self-defined current economic status (pl031) 
0=employee working full or part time, 1=self-employed 
working full or part time
Type of contract Based on Type of contract (pl140) 0=permanent job, 
1=temporary job
Réka Branyiczki: In-work poverty among immigrants in the EU 105
Table 2. Macro level explanatory variables of in-work poverty.
Variable Operationalization Data Source
Labor market institutions
Coordination of wage setting The coordination of wage setting is 
an indicator that uses  values from 1 
to 5 (from least to most coordination) 
summarizing many aspects of wage 
coordination, like bargaining coverage, 
level and type of coordination, 
predominant level of bargaining, 
the average length of agreements, 
government intervention, grades of 
administrative extension of agreements, 
minimum wage setting, employer 
organization and union centralization, etc. 
The indicator comes from the Database 
on Institutional Characteristics of Trade 
Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention 
and Social Pacts in 34 countries between 
1960 and 2012 (ICTWSS), created by Jelle 
Visser, Amsterdam Institute for Advanced 
Labour Studies (AIAS).
Visser, Jelle 2012. 
“Database on 
Institutional 
Characteristics of Trade 
Unions, Wage Setting, 
State Intervention 
and Social Pacts in 34 
countries between 
1960 and 2012.” http://
www.uva-aias.net/208
Qualificational composition of 
labor force
Share of low educated  (ISCED 0-2) among 
working age (18-64) population
EU-SILC-2012 (author’s 
own calculation)
Welfare regime
Unemployment replacement rate Net replacement rates for a married 
single-earner couple with 2 children, 67% 
of the average wage in the initial phase 
of unemployment (2011)
OECD Benefits and 
Wages Statistics
% of cash benefits paid to the 
lowest quintile
Percentage of public social benefits in 
cash paid to the lowest income quintiles 
of the total population (2011 )
OECD  Social 
Expenditure 
database 
Family cash benefits as % of GDP Family cash transferred public spending, 
% of GDP (2011)
OECD  Social 
Expenditure 
database 
Public expenditure on child-care 
and pre-school as % of GDP
Public expenditure on childcare and pre-
school as % of GDP (2011)
OECD  Social 
Expenditure 
database 
Public childcare availability Average number of weekly hours of 
formal care from 3 years to minimum 
compulsory school age - Children with or 
without formal care (2011)
Eurostat
Female employment Female unemployment rate, annual 
average, % (2011)
Eurostat
Intergenerational dependency Share of young unemployed (20-29 
years) living in parents’ (mother’s and/or 
father’s) household
EU-SILC-2012 (own 
calculation)
Economic controls
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate, annual average,  % 
(2011)
Eurostat
Economic growth (real, %) Real GDP growth rate, volume, 
percentage change on previous year 
(2011)
Eurostat
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Table 3. Regression results of Model (1) on a subsample of EU15 (Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Portugal, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom), EU5 (Germany, Spain, Italy, United Kingdom 
and France) and Mediterranean countries (Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal).
EU15 EU5
Mediterranean 
countries
 Household income (% of median) M1.3 M1.3 M1.3 M1.3 M1.3 M1.3
Immigrant -0.108*** -0.117** -0.175*
(0.0272) (0.0417) (0.0471)
Immigrant_eu -0.102*** -0.0957* -0.147***
(0.0318) (0.0389) (0.00564)
Immigrant_o -0.113*** -0.125* -0.189
(0.0320) (0.0483) (0.0698)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labor market circumstances Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.276** 0.275** 0.270 0.271 0.280*** 0.279***
(0.0943) (0.0947) (0.155) (0.154) (0.0214) (0.0227)
Observations 49,601 49,601 27,817 27,817 13,682 13,682
R-squared 0.288 0.288 0.240 0.240 0.406 0.406
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Confidence levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The reference category for 
the Immigrant dummies is Native.  
Table 4. Multilevel random-effects logistic regression estimated for a sample of 22 EU 
member states. 
Working poverty M2.4
Immigrant 0.857***
(0.0451)
Micro-level controls Yes
Labor market institutions variables Yes
Welfare regime variables Yes
Economic control variables Yes
Constant 4.222
(3.033)
Observations 50,672
lnsig2u -2.303***
Sigma_u 0.316***
Rho 0.029***
Confidence levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0: chibar2(01) =   119.77 Prob >= chibar2 = 0.000.
